Introduction:
I've always liked the simplicity of the single word motto - 'progress' - I like that it sums up Blackpool's breezy and future facing attitude upon which the town was built. I also like that it doesn't make an overly bold claim. I like that it's a practical phrase, something that can be viewed in different ways. It's not a stuffy latin motto, it's not overblown. It's simple and to me, it's a crucial word when considering where we are and what we're doing as a football club.
We all know that we made a terrific start to post Oyston-life, quickly putting in place a new mentality and a squad of young and talented players, managed by a young and talented manager. It felt for a while, we were the very definition of 'progress.'
We all know that it went wrong at some point and that since that point things haven't been great. I feel like I've written all this before. I feel like I'm going round in circles, living the same thing repeating season upon season - optimism, fading belief, some signings that don't really change anything much, a change in manager and repeat the cycle.
It's always tempting to lay into people and cite the failings of the present. Football fans the world over do this every week - but this article is an attempt to understand the situation by stepping back a little bit, to objectively review facts and see what learning can be taken from looking at the big picture. That sounds pompous, maybe even a little superior in tone - but it's all I've got left. I can't write the same blog, over and over, bemoaning the same weaknesses and pointing out the same failings - something, eventually, has to give. I don't know if this piece really gets to the heart of things or not - but it's my best attempt to get a bit closer to understanding what has gone wrong and perhaps, why it may have done so.
Everything in here is culled from public sources of data. I've done my best to not use any speculative data - all finance information comes direct from the club accounts. Transfer information comes from online sources but I've only used factual data (i.e. dates of birth and dates of transfers but no fee data.) I've used the WhoScored database for performance data unless otherwise stated as I believe this to be as accurate a source as is available to the general public. I've used AI only occasionally in support of laying out data in a visual format. The actual data within any graphics is sourced as above and calculated by me. As such any errors or omissions are on me or the source data I've used.
Finally, it's important to say that any 'external' analysis such as this is limited. I am not privy to anything like the same level of data as will exist within the club. It's perfectly possible that other metrics tell a different story. This is an attempt to be constructive and objective as opposed to wilfully critical - I, like other fans, only want Blackpool FC to succeed. Raised as I am on mostly misery, punctuated by the occasional bit of madness and fleeting glory, I am pragmatic about what 'success' represent and, to use a key phrase again, it's not so much a lack of promotion or silverware that concerns me, but a sense that progress is hard to identify over a period of time.
Part 1: The broad situation over time
Below, a graph charts our fall from our recent high of 16th in the Championship to our position at the time of writing (28 places lower)
When we look at it in a really simple visual manner, it's clear to see that the most literal kind of 'progress' is distinctly lacking. In the most simple terms, winning football matches gets you higher up the league - that's the most obvious measure of how a football club is progressing. As it stands, we're looking at a 6th season of decline in a row. It's not spectacular decline, it's not the kind of existential crisis that sees us plummeting through the divisions and fearing for our very existence - but it's certainly not what anyone would consider as 'progress'
Lets be absolutely realistic. We can't expect to go forward endlessly. Reaching the Championship (and staying there convincingly) was a real achievement. Simon Sadler has money and has been willing to spend it - but the kind of money required to push on beyond the second tier is insane and to not succeed in immediately establishing us at Championship level was no disgrace. We can talk about 'spirit and passion' all we like - but successful football clubs have a lot more than that - and money is always a factor. I'm not trying to limit possibilities here - but simply framing what 'progress' is in the context of the piece and trying to establish that I wouldn't expect a simple upward curve culminating in European Cup glory after 5 seasons.
It's the later period of the above chart that is most problematic - because, in this division, we are spending proper money. Yes, there have been some 'big' teams but over a period of time, we've spent in a way that is just not typical of our history prior to this point and in a manner that should allow us to compete regularly - something we've looked less likely to do as each season passes.
Lets illustrate this in a really simple manner - if we extract the figures for wages for the last 'pre-Sadler' set of accounts and set it against the most recent available accounts we can see how in a short space of time, we're spending more than double the money
It's clear to see from the accounts that the club is well backed financially in comparison to earlier eras. Even allowing for an expected wage growth of around 30%, it's evident that we're spending more that twice what we were spending in that final season before the recent takeover.
Below is a more detailed breakdown of what we shall call 'the Sadler era to date' - remember, when reading this, we're dealing with 'lagged data' - so we don't have figures for the most recent seasons - remember also, the graphs ONLY show STAFF COSTS vs turnover - not any additional operational costs (for example, pitch, stadium or training ground development or maintenance). What we can see here quite clearly, is that significant progress has been made in terms of increasing turnover (an obvious positive in terms of the clubs longer term viability) but staff costs have increased significantly - we can also see that turnover is dwindling (a 3 year trend) whilst staff costs (not withstanding the in year 'cliff edge' drop after relegation) continue to rise. It's not the purpose of this article to deal in depth with financial regulations - but rising wage costs and falling turnover are not a good mix in terms of that...
Lets briefly refresh ourselves with the point - namely, our recent and ongoing backsliding.
In the final 'pre-Sadler' season, the manager was Terry McPhillips - a hasty appointment that summed up the chaos of the latter days of Oyston. He'd never before (and never since) managed a football league club. We finished 10th - something that is, interestingly and conveniently enough for this blog, our median final position since being relegated back to League 1 in 2022. In simple terms, we've paid a hell of a lot more (basically double) money to players and managers to finish (on average) in basically that same place. Neil Critchley, Steve Bruce and Ian Evatt are all far more respected figures than Terry McPhillips and all had larger budgets at their disposal - but on average, between them, their overall outcome was about the same.
This is where we have to start asking questions. Why is this? Why are we struggling to out perform a much worse version of ourselves even though we have now attained:
- More staff (and staff with stronger reputations within football)
- Significantly improved training facilities
- A modernised approach to injury and rehab
- A pitch that is the envy of the rest of the division (and much of the division above)
- A significant boost in home support (obviously, the ending of the boycott influences this, but support in League 1 has been higher than during our previous pre boycott Lg 1 spell)
- Greater investment in players
Looking at the list above, we can see clear evidence of 'progress' - If we'd made a wishlist of 'how to become a proper football club' at the end of the Oyston era then by now, we'd have ticked off quite a lot of the structural elements on that list.
This clearly isn't a simple tale of under investment and neglect. It's anything but. You only have to look at Bloomfield Road's interior, resplendent in glorious murals and glossy tangerine paint to see that there is an effort to move the club forward, to improve it, to show care and love for the thing.
If we can accept that the intent is good - then we have to start to wonder about the execution of that intent. If (at least some) of the structural defects of the club have been addressed, why are we not moving forward on the pitch?
Lets look first at player recruitment - because that is the foundation upon which any football team is put together.
Part 2: Recruitment - a long term picture
*In the data that follows - I've used the whole number of age at signing - i.e. I've not taken into account if a player is 20 years 11 months old, instead simply citing '20' as their age - therefore the average age is a crude figure - but accurate enough to indicate trends)
Firstly, let's consider the total number and average age of our signings:
Secondly, lets look at the age breakdown in a little more depth - I've categorised any permanent signing of a player 23 or under as 'early career' - 24-28 as 'mid career' and 29 or older as 'late career' - this visual represents the proportion of players who fall into the brackets above in relation to the total transfer business related to that season:
What this graph illustrates very, very clearly is that in recent seasons we have invested much more heavily in players we might expect to be already 'developed' and much less in what we might term as 'prospects.' We can look at the raw data for an idea of what that means in practice - then within the first 3 seasons of the period in question, we signed 22 players aged 23 or under. In the most recent 3 seasons, we've signed just 5.
We can clearly see a reversal in emphasis, from plenty of youth with a sprinkling of experience to a lot of experience and a sprinkling of youth.
If we slightly tweak the numbers to look at 'players 28 or older' then we see the clear difference in the age profile of our transfer activity within two selective 3 season periods - 19/20 to 21/22 and 24/25 to date
It's perhaps also worth noting, that in the two most successful seasons of the period in question, we only signed a SINGLE player over the age of 27 (Richard Keogh) - representing a grand total of 3.7% of all our permanent transfer business.
By contrast, 43% of our permanent transfer business has been focused on players who are 28 or older in the most recent 2 seasons. Whilst accepting the point that our current position is subject to change, as it stands, this season and the previous season have been significantly less successful than either of the seasons where we focused on youth as a key element in our recruitment process.
Lets establish that the focus of recruitment has shifted - but that piece of learning alone doesn't account for our struggles - plenty of teams have used experience to build success and youth isn't a magic cure-all - plenty of young players struggle and plenty of teams built on them will do poorly.
Part 2.1 Recruitment - why are we struggling?
Lets break down what 'good recruitment' means: We could suggest it means the following
a) targeting quality players
b) putting them within a system that suits them
c) giving them players that compliment their abilities to play with
Lets consider the first factor - the quality of players recruited - essentially, in order to establish if we've recruited 'quality' we need to decide whether or not a player has been a success.
On the surface, the answer would seem glaringly obvious - we've slipped backwards in the league over time - so surely, we've recruited worse players? That said, we can see that we've gradually spent more money so surely that would equate to better players? This is the central problem we're wrestling with. How is possible that we're both getting 'better players' AND getting incrementally worse as a football team?
A further factor comes into play - it's very difficult to properly weigh the raw quality due to the number and frequency of injuries suffered by the players recruited recently.
The table below shows (crudely) the percentage of available minutes that each signing of the last 3 seasons has played during their time at the club. It is adjusted to reflect the number of seasons each player has played for the club for but ISN'T adjusted to show the precise time of every signing (or early release, if that falls before the end of the season) - the notes indicate where I'm aware of any inaccuracies.
Because of the sheer number of absences, it's difficult to declare many of the players above a 'success' in recruitment terms - because most of them have missed at least 40% of the minutes they could have played (or, to put it in equally crude terms, 2 in every 5 games)
Even if we remove the sub keepers from the list, it still paints a grim picture. Of the 22 players listed, how many could we categorise as a clear 'success'? At absolute best, I'd say 4 of them (Bloxham has youth on his side and still has latent potential to unlock, BPF has played very well this season and during the latter part of last year, Karoy has been a good signing with a future value and, overall, Fletcher definitely came good after a poor start. That's a very positive reading I think as some of the 'hits' have had significant periods where they've looked like a 'miss'
How many would we call definitive 'misses'? I'd say that number is much higher, no matter how objective or charitable I am about the business we've done. It's arguable that it's unfair on injured players to declare them 'failures' as a result of injuries - and it's possible some of these players will prove in time to have a positive impact on the squad so we could declare them as 'maybes'- but it's undeniably evident that the impact of many has been limited for one reason or another
One thing is clear - reading the list, it's very hard to make a case for any of these signings (beyond Bloxham and Taylor, and even then, subject to them actually consistently being both fit and showing their best selves) offering much in terms of sell on value - the reliability we've searched for in turning our attention to older players was always going to have an impact on the overall resale value of the squad - but we've been absolutely crucified by the fact that what we hoped would be 'reliable, battle hardened experience' has proved to be anything but and we've now got limited collective resale value and are further off the pace than we made the decision to abandon youth in favour of experience.
Recruitment is never about signing 100% successes - but the hit rate in recent seasons suggests a revised approach to either how we screen players or how we manage fitness once they're part of our squad is desperately needed.
Part 2.2 Recruitment - Fitting into a system?
Lets look now at the idea of players fitting into a system being a factor in success. Lets consider that the first team manager is probably the biggest influence on the style of play and remind ourselves of the history:
We've had 6 different managerial appointments in the full extent of the time we're looking at and the average appointment length is only just over 1 year. Putting aside caretaker stints, Neil Critchley (at the time of writing) has managed us for 7 more days than all the other managers (Grayson, Appleton, McCarthy, Bruce and Evatt) combined. The only stability we can realistically say we've found has been in the two tenures of Neil Critchley - (both of them longer spells than any other manager) and probably, the three full seasons under Critchley were the 3 best seasons of the Sadler era.
It's difficult to see any particular system or style at work over the whole picture - if anything, we can see a pattern of moving from one thing to another in consecutive appointments. Staring at the list of managers and trying to join the dots between them doesn't yield any obvious clues or master plan. The only sense seems to come if we see each appointment as a reaction to the previous - which suggests a decision making process based on the immediate need as opposed to a longer term vision - in essence, a reactionary process as opposed to a planned one.
That lack of a 'through line' can be overstated - no club sets a defined formation and tactical approach for every successive manager in every game - but it's easy to see how the recruitment in season A can end up looking poor in season B if what the new manager wants is fundamentally different to their predecessor.
I've always liked the simplicity of the single word motto - 'progress' - I like that it sums up Blackpool's breezy and future facing attitude upon which the town was built. I also like that it doesn't make an overly bold claim. I like that it's a practical phrase, something that can be viewed in different ways. It's not a stuffy latin motto, it's not overblown. It's simple and to me, it's a crucial word when considering where we are and what we're doing as a football club.
We all know that we made a terrific start to post Oyston-life, quickly putting in place a new mentality and a squad of young and talented players, managed by a young and talented manager. It felt for a while, we were the very definition of 'progress.'
We all know that it went wrong at some point and that since that point things haven't been great. I feel like I've written all this before. I feel like I'm going round in circles, living the same thing repeating season upon season - optimism, fading belief, some signings that don't really change anything much, a change in manager and repeat the cycle.
It's always tempting to lay into people and cite the failings of the present. Football fans the world over do this every week - but this article is an attempt to understand the situation by stepping back a little bit, to objectively review facts and see what learning can be taken from looking at the big picture. That sounds pompous, maybe even a little superior in tone - but it's all I've got left. I can't write the same blog, over and over, bemoaning the same weaknesses and pointing out the same failings - something, eventually, has to give. I don't know if this piece really gets to the heart of things or not - but it's my best attempt to get a bit closer to understanding what has gone wrong and perhaps, why it may have done so.
Everything in here is culled from public sources of data. I've done my best to not use any speculative data - all finance information comes direct from the club accounts. Transfer information comes from online sources but I've only used factual data (i.e. dates of birth and dates of transfers but no fee data.) I've used the WhoScored database for performance data unless otherwise stated as I believe this to be as accurate a source as is available to the general public. I've used AI only occasionally in support of laying out data in a visual format. The actual data within any graphics is sourced as above and calculated by me. As such any errors or omissions are on me or the source data I've used.
Finally, it's important to say that any 'external' analysis such as this is limited. I am not privy to anything like the same level of data as will exist within the club. It's perfectly possible that other metrics tell a different story. This is an attempt to be constructive and objective as opposed to wilfully critical - I, like other fans, only want Blackpool FC to succeed. Raised as I am on mostly misery, punctuated by the occasional bit of madness and fleeting glory, I am pragmatic about what 'success' represent and, to use a key phrase again, it's not so much a lack of promotion or silverware that concerns me, but a sense that progress is hard to identify over a period of time.
Part 1: The broad situation over time
Below, a graph charts our fall from our recent high of 16th in the Championship to our position at the time of writing (28 places lower)
When we look at it in a really simple visual manner, it's clear to see that the most literal kind of 'progress' is distinctly lacking. In the most simple terms, winning football matches gets you higher up the league - that's the most obvious measure of how a football club is progressing. As it stands, we're looking at a 6th season of decline in a row. It's not spectacular decline, it's not the kind of existential crisis that sees us plummeting through the divisions and fearing for our very existence - but it's certainly not what anyone would consider as 'progress'
Lets be absolutely realistic. We can't expect to go forward endlessly. Reaching the Championship (and staying there convincingly) was a real achievement. Simon Sadler has money and has been willing to spend it - but the kind of money required to push on beyond the second tier is insane and to not succeed in immediately establishing us at Championship level was no disgrace. We can talk about 'spirit and passion' all we like - but successful football clubs have a lot more than that - and money is always a factor. I'm not trying to limit possibilities here - but simply framing what 'progress' is in the context of the piece and trying to establish that I wouldn't expect a simple upward curve culminating in European Cup glory after 5 seasons.
It's the later period of the above chart that is most problematic - because, in this division, we are spending proper money. Yes, there have been some 'big' teams but over a period of time, we've spent in a way that is just not typical of our history prior to this point and in a manner that should allow us to compete regularly - something we've looked less likely to do as each season passes.
Lets illustrate this in a really simple manner - if we extract the figures for wages for the last 'pre-Sadler' set of accounts and set it against the most recent available accounts we can see how in a short space of time, we're spending more than double the money
It's clear to see from the accounts that the club is well backed financially in comparison to earlier eras. Even allowing for an expected wage growth of around 30%, it's evident that we're spending more that twice what we were spending in that final season before the recent takeover.
Below is a more detailed breakdown of what we shall call 'the Sadler era to date' - remember, when reading this, we're dealing with 'lagged data' - so we don't have figures for the most recent seasons - remember also, the graphs ONLY show STAFF COSTS vs turnover - not any additional operational costs (for example, pitch, stadium or training ground development or maintenance). What we can see here quite clearly, is that significant progress has been made in terms of increasing turnover (an obvious positive in terms of the clubs longer term viability) but staff costs have increased significantly - we can also see that turnover is dwindling (a 3 year trend) whilst staff costs (not withstanding the in year 'cliff edge' drop after relegation) continue to rise. It's not the purpose of this article to deal in depth with financial regulations - but rising wage costs and falling turnover are not a good mix in terms of that...
Lets briefly refresh ourselves with the point - namely, our recent and ongoing backsliding.
In the final 'pre-Sadler' season, the manager was Terry McPhillips - a hasty appointment that summed up the chaos of the latter days of Oyston. He'd never before (and never since) managed a football league club. We finished 10th - something that is, interestingly and conveniently enough for this blog, our median final position since being relegated back to League 1 in 2022. In simple terms, we've paid a hell of a lot more (basically double) money to players and managers to finish (on average) in basically that same place. Neil Critchley, Steve Bruce and Ian Evatt are all far more respected figures than Terry McPhillips and all had larger budgets at their disposal - but on average, between them, their overall outcome was about the same.
This is where we have to start asking questions. Why is this? Why are we struggling to out perform a much worse version of ourselves even though we have now attained:
- More staff (and staff with stronger reputations within football)
- Significantly improved training facilities
- A modernised approach to injury and rehab
- A pitch that is the envy of the rest of the division (and much of the division above)
- A significant boost in home support (obviously, the ending of the boycott influences this, but support in League 1 has been higher than during our previous pre boycott Lg 1 spell)
- Greater investment in players
Looking at the list above, we can see clear evidence of 'progress' - If we'd made a wishlist of 'how to become a proper football club' at the end of the Oyston era then by now, we'd have ticked off quite a lot of the structural elements on that list.
This clearly isn't a simple tale of under investment and neglect. It's anything but. You only have to look at Bloomfield Road's interior, resplendent in glorious murals and glossy tangerine paint to see that there is an effort to move the club forward, to improve it, to show care and love for the thing.
If we can accept that the intent is good - then we have to start to wonder about the execution of that intent. If (at least some) of the structural defects of the club have been addressed, why are we not moving forward on the pitch?
Lets look first at player recruitment - because that is the foundation upon which any football team is put together.
Part 2: Recruitment - a long term picture
*In the data that follows - I've used the whole number of age at signing - i.e. I've not taken into account if a player is 20 years 11 months old, instead simply citing '20' as their age - therefore the average age is a crude figure - but accurate enough to indicate trends)
Firstly, let's consider the total number and average age of our signings:
Secondly, lets look at the age breakdown in a little more depth - I've categorised any permanent signing of a player 23 or under as 'early career' - 24-28 as 'mid career' and 29 or older as 'late career' - this visual represents the proportion of players who fall into the brackets above in relation to the total transfer business related to that season:
What this graph illustrates very, very clearly is that in recent seasons we have invested much more heavily in players we might expect to be already 'developed' and much less in what we might term as 'prospects.' We can look at the raw data for an idea of what that means in practice - then within the first 3 seasons of the period in question, we signed 22 players aged 23 or under. In the most recent 3 seasons, we've signed just 5.
We can clearly see a reversal in emphasis, from plenty of youth with a sprinkling of experience to a lot of experience and a sprinkling of youth.
If we slightly tweak the numbers to look at 'players 28 or older' then we see the clear difference in the age profile of our transfer activity within two selective 3 season periods - 19/20 to 21/22 and 24/25 to date
It's perhaps also worth noting, that in the two most successful seasons of the period in question, we only signed a SINGLE player over the age of 27 (Richard Keogh) - representing a grand total of 3.7% of all our permanent transfer business.
By contrast, 43% of our permanent transfer business has been focused on players who are 28 or older in the most recent 2 seasons. Whilst accepting the point that our current position is subject to change, as it stands, this season and the previous season have been significantly less successful than either of the seasons where we focused on youth as a key element in our recruitment process.
Lets establish that the focus of recruitment has shifted - but that piece of learning alone doesn't account for our struggles - plenty of teams have used experience to build success and youth isn't a magic cure-all - plenty of young players struggle and plenty of teams built on them will do poorly.
Part 2.1 Recruitment - why are we struggling?
Lets break down what 'good recruitment' means: We could suggest it means the following
a) targeting quality players
b) putting them within a system that suits them
c) giving them players that compliment their abilities to play with
Lets consider the first factor - the quality of players recruited - essentially, in order to establish if we've recruited 'quality' we need to decide whether or not a player has been a success.
On the surface, the answer would seem glaringly obvious - we've slipped backwards in the league over time - so surely, we've recruited worse players? That said, we can see that we've gradually spent more money so surely that would equate to better players? This is the central problem we're wrestling with. How is possible that we're both getting 'better players' AND getting incrementally worse as a football team?
A further factor comes into play - it's very difficult to properly weigh the raw quality due to the number and frequency of injuries suffered by the players recruited recently.
The table below shows (crudely) the percentage of available minutes that each signing of the last 3 seasons has played during their time at the club. It is adjusted to reflect the number of seasons each player has played for the club for but ISN'T adjusted to show the precise time of every signing (or early release, if that falls before the end of the season) - the notes indicate where I'm aware of any inaccuracies.
Because of the sheer number of absences, it's difficult to declare many of the players above a 'success' in recruitment terms - because most of them have missed at least 40% of the minutes they could have played (or, to put it in equally crude terms, 2 in every 5 games)
Even if we remove the sub keepers from the list, it still paints a grim picture. Of the 22 players listed, how many could we categorise as a clear 'success'? At absolute best, I'd say 4 of them (Bloxham has youth on his side and still has latent potential to unlock, BPF has played very well this season and during the latter part of last year, Karoy has been a good signing with a future value and, overall, Fletcher definitely came good after a poor start. That's a very positive reading I think as some of the 'hits' have had significant periods where they've looked like a 'miss'
How many would we call definitive 'misses'? I'd say that number is much higher, no matter how objective or charitable I am about the business we've done. It's arguable that it's unfair on injured players to declare them 'failures' as a result of injuries - and it's possible some of these players will prove in time to have a positive impact on the squad so we could declare them as 'maybes'- but it's undeniably evident that the impact of many has been limited for one reason or another
One thing is clear - reading the list, it's very hard to make a case for any of these signings (beyond Bloxham and Taylor, and even then, subject to them actually consistently being both fit and showing their best selves) offering much in terms of sell on value - the reliability we've searched for in turning our attention to older players was always going to have an impact on the overall resale value of the squad - but we've been absolutely crucified by the fact that what we hoped would be 'reliable, battle hardened experience' has proved to be anything but and we've now got limited collective resale value and are further off the pace than we made the decision to abandon youth in favour of experience.
Recruitment is never about signing 100% successes - but the hit rate in recent seasons suggests a revised approach to either how we screen players or how we manage fitness once they're part of our squad is desperately needed.
Part 2.2 Recruitment - Fitting into a system?
Lets look now at the idea of players fitting into a system being a factor in success. Lets consider that the first team manager is probably the biggest influence on the style of play and remind ourselves of the history:
We've had 6 different managerial appointments in the full extent of the time we're looking at and the average appointment length is only just over 1 year. Putting aside caretaker stints, Neil Critchley (at the time of writing) has managed us for 7 more days than all the other managers (Grayson, Appleton, McCarthy, Bruce and Evatt) combined. The only stability we can realistically say we've found has been in the two tenures of Neil Critchley - (both of them longer spells than any other manager) and probably, the three full seasons under Critchley were the 3 best seasons of the Sadler era.
 |
| It's a shit AI graphic - but it's not totally without merit in terms of summarising our broad approach. |
It's difficult to see any particular system or style at work over the whole picture - if anything, we can see a pattern of moving from one thing to another in consecutive appointments. Staring at the list of managers and trying to join the dots between them doesn't yield any obvious clues or master plan. The only sense seems to come if we see each appointment as a reaction to the previous - which suggests a decision making process based on the immediate need as opposed to a longer term vision - in essence, a reactionary process as opposed to a planned one.
That lack of a 'through line' can be overstated - no club sets a defined formation and tactical approach for every successive manager in every game - but it's easy to see how the recruitment in season A can end up looking poor in season B if what the new manager wants is fundamentally different to their predecessor.
If we look at the most recent switch of styles between Steve Bruce and Ian Evatt - Bruce wanted old fashioned wingers (across Bruce's 2 and a bit seasons we signed 7 and had Rob Apter and CJ Hamilton already in the squad as an 8th and 9th.) However, Ian Evatt doesn't really want wingers at all and the wingers who've remained from those 9 have had to adapt or leave. That might not be the most significant issue, but it shows quite neatly how the focus can change between managers - When Evatt took over from Bruce, Scott Banks and Emil Hanson became almost immediately superfluous and Josh Bowler and CJ Hamilton had to play a different role in order to get game time. For a club such as ours, that's a significant percentage of any given season's budget, the value and purpose of which has suddenly changed as the footballing ethos alters.
In attacking terms we can see some improvement, even if the number of goals hasn't proportionally improved that much. We are shooting more, the XG suggests we're having 'better' shots when we shoot and we're dribbling more successfully. The imbalance though has been present for some time and we're still struggling to get crosses into the box. Through ball stats are slightly deceptive as for some reason the data source rounds up through balls per game to a whole number (therefore grouping a lot of teams together) so a drop from 2 to 24th isn't quite as dramatic as it seems but nonetheless we've failed this season to play as many. It's also notable that we've become weaker in the air against the previous season.
What we can see from the above is that it's possible to discern a little bit of progress in some areas against the previous season. It's not an overwhelming amount and we could equally point to areas where our performance has declined.
This is a superficial analysis as I've already acknowledged - but the data above does point to a struggling team and the results within the period don't really contradict that. If there's other metrics available somewhere which create a different narrative, then great - but ultimately, results and performance and the data available here would suggest that we don't have significant grounds for optimism right now.
The story told above is one of a team that, despite two different managers and three transfer windows isn't showing any huge signs of improvement or any obvious evidence of being outstanding at anything in particular. There are glaring weaknesses that are present over a long period and whilst all teams have weaknesses, good recruitment addresses weaknesses and creates strengths that counter balance the issues.
If we briefly analyse our last promotion side, it's not immediate obvious that we were a very good team (data like passing accuracy, tackles, interceptions is all quite 'mid table') - as we dig deeper though, we see a superb ability to restrict the opponents shots (4/24). That season we conceded 0 goals from counter attacks, were 2/24 in terms of goals from open play and 2/24 from goals at set pieces, were 3/24 in terms of restricting crosses into our box and despite Neil Critchley's reputation for 'fannying about at the back' spent the least time of any team in our own third of the pitch and are high up (7/24) for shots per game. In other words, whilst the team isn't good at everything, it's really good at some things, particular individuals (Ballard and Madine at the front and the back) are statistically dominant in the air and Kenny Dougall in the centre of midfield wins the most tackles of any player in the league.
The point here, is that not every player needs to be good in the air or great at winning tackles. The side of 20/21 was only 'average' at that as a whole - but it had the right blend of players in the right place and some significant overall aptitudes and that isn't something that is apparent when we look at this current squad or the previous one.
For what it's worth, whilst we're in the mood for comparing and contrasting, Critchley's 2nd go at things was also palpably significantly better than where we are now (5/24 for XGa 7/24 for XG, 8/24 shots per game, 2/24 shots against per game, 4/24 aerial duels won 8/24 passing accuracy, 8/24 interceptions per game, 5/24 set pieces conceded, 3/24 time spent in own third.) I cite that data to illustrate that when we returned to the division we're still in, whilst we might have lacked a pleasing style of play and had a nasty habit of losing away from home, we certainly were 'competitive' and possessed of significant relative strengths. In other words, the decline to where we are now wasn't inevitable and the relegation and chaos of the McCarthy/Appleton season hadn't damaged us fatally. The real decline has happened since.
I'd love to analyse the difference between the immediate pre-Sadler era squad and this one in order to fully ram home the point about costs and performance, but unfortunately there is no detailed data available for 2018/19 - so, we'll just have to remember once more that we finished 10th under Terry McPhillips. I don't remember all that much about that squad, but I do remember we had height at the back in Ben Hennigan, we had height up front in Armand Gnanduillet, we had Liam Feeney to deliver a cross to him, Jay Spearing to rat about, some young quality in Jordan Thompson and Marc Bola and whilst the football was rugged, it basically made sense even if it wasn't much fun to watch.
Part 4: What do we learn from all this?
My feeling over the last few years is that what we're doing doesn't make sense. We're spending more money to get less and making decisions I don't understand when I step back and look at things objectively.
Lets be clear, I'm a hypocrite - I'm writing this as if I'm a clinical observer and with the benefit of hindsight. I'm a) a fan and b) I make lots of wrong calls. Nonetheless, I shall continue!
4.1: Decision making is reactive and that creates problems if trying to execute 'a plan'
If we take, say, the decision to dismiss Neil Critchley as a case study - I was as fed up as the next man at his cautious football and as jilted as the next lover by his flit to Aston Villa. I shed no tears when Critchley left - but it's clear as night follows day in the data that Critchley produced the two best teams we've had in League One since Simon Grayson's promotion side. What I don't understand is why this wasn't more evident to the objective decision makers and why switching to Steve Bruce football was the obvious solution to a poor home defeat against Stockport, when really, the obvious thing lacking in the previous season was essentially, decent quality wing backs or a little bit more freedom/flexibility. Instead of an evolution, we got a wholesale change in approach.
4.2: Changing styles frequently leaves holes in the make up of squads
If a lack of wing backs was a glaring hole in the Critchley blueprint, I've never understood how it was that Steve Bruce's Blackpool (long balls per game rank within division 1/24) was never furnished with a genuine physical centre forward - particularly as unlike Critchley, Bruce liked to play much deeper, spending a lot more time in our own third making that out ball really important. Similarly, Bruce favoured a midfield two which begged for a dominant all action midfielder - Neil Critchley preferred a 3 and had a much more technical style so Bruce's midfield never really looked quite 'right' even in his generally quite enjoyable first season.
Now we have Ian Evatt, who talks of total football and fluidity but has literally zero pace available in defence, even with everyone fit and has inherited the total absence of dominant physicality in the forward line and a load of aging players on long contracts because for reasons that aren't wholly clear, we've stopped making any real effort to bring in younger players despite the sums raised over time by their sales.
4.3: The club doesn't seem to have a plan and if it does, lacks the confidence to stick to that plan:
The decision making by the club has, at times, seemed almost like that of a supporter. Perhaps that makes sense to some degree because the owner is a supporter (and let me be clear, I'd every day of the week, rather that than a faceless body or someone with zero connection with the club.) We do however, spend quite a lot of money on various staff at executive level and below, to ensure that we make professional decisions - and yet, sometimes, it feels like we act 'on a whim', on an opportunity or according to sentiment as opposed to the kind of cold logic that drives the best footballing decisions.
Fans will always say 'the club should listen to us' and to some extent, yes, it should, when things like ticketing and other 'matchday experience and supporter culture' elements are concerned.
What it shouldn't do is operate on the basis of fan sentiment, firing managers because the fans dislike them or buying players because the fans like them and so on and so forth. Fans are idiots, me included. I wrote plenty of complaint about Neil Critchley and I wrote at length about how we needed to spend all the money on Steve Bruce's new team because nothing could possibly go wrong. Neither proved to be the right 'take' - but then, we are just fans, we are just idiots chatting shit about football in our spare time. It's not what we're being paid to do. We bring the emotion to the game, we bring the desperation, the romanticism, the superstition and all the rest - the professionals should bring the knowledge and the clinical decision making.
We could equally see the signing of Jerry Yates in a similar way. We already possess Dion Charles and Dale Taylor who are similar players to Yates - what we needed was probably something a bit different. Again, don't get me wrong, I was absolutely thrilled to see Jerry back in tangerine - but when that signing probably means we're unlikely to possess anyone who effectively contrasts Charles or Taylor, then I'd wonder if, in the cold light of day, it was quite the right choice to make. Let me be really clear, I'd not rule out Jerry being a success for a moment and I'd be thrilled if he proves so - but the fact is, to end up with three strikers who are all essentially the same player and the only alternative being a fitful semi-converted winger doesn't look like long term planning for all outcomes and situations.
4.4 Change is desperately needed
If we go back to the opening analysis we can see that we've got a real need to improve the outcomes from our recruitment - remember, we're not simply performing worse season on season, but we're also spending more money, year on year with dwindling turnover. Put very simply, with financial rules as they are (where permitted wages and turnover are related and owner input into playing squad purchases subject to more limitiations) we have no choice but to make our money work harder than it does now.
Our recruitment has, over a period of time, failed to generate success on the pitch or the prospect of increasing our income through player sales. If that trend continues, turnover/income will decline and we'll be even further limited in terms of the quality of player we can bring in to the club - that's an obvious cycle of decline in waiting as if we can't turn £10 million into success, why would the same staff be able to turn a smaller figure into a coherent football team?
The change that is needed includes is a clear direction or purpose. A renewed sense of what the club is doing, what its basic footballing values are which would in turn, provide a clear process for decisions across the staff body.
In order to achieve that, it needs an objective individual with strong knowledge of what it takes to put together a successful football structure. That person needs to the conviction to stick to a plan, because a plan over time is how to get genuine value for money - through well targeted, shrewd and logical signings, based around defined need, built upon year on year. That person also needs to ensure the club then has the right culture to make the absolute most out of those signings.
Whilst yes, there's a part of every football supporter that wants to win every week, most fans would get behind such an approach and would recognise that whilst it's highly unlikely (and indeed, under financial rules, nigh upon impossible) we'll outspend everyone in the division, the idea of trying to be more canny in what we do is necessary.
There should be no doom about this. We've done this before in recent memory and we can do it again. There's no financial reason why we can't - all that is stopping us is footballing decisions. Not every club in League 1 submits full accounts, so it's not possible to discern exactly how much everyone spends on wages. What we can say for certain is that Cambridge's most recent accounts suggest a total spend of 6.5 (about 2/3rd of our most recent spend) million - they currently sit 7th in the league having lost 2 in 13. Lincoln City's most recent set of accounts suggest a total wage spend of 7.5 million (about 76% of our figure for the same season) - and yet, they sit well above us in the pyramid.
We don't have the *most* money in this division - but competing in League 1 is clearly well within our means. It's understandable that we couldn't keep up with Birmingham or Wrexham, but the approach we've taken since we've dropped out of the division above (and whether coincidentally or otherwise) hasn't allowed us to compete with clubs who have less than us. Clubs such as those mentioned above as well as Stevenage, Mansfield and others would cut their hands off to have our resources and evidence suggests, would use them better.
It's time for a clean slate and a new approach. We can all be extremely grateful for Simon Sadler's ownership and his ongoing investment is beyond doubt, we can and most of us do, accept him as one of our own - but in doing so, we also reserve the right to do what we'd do to anyone else in the fan base - which is point out differences of opinion. Football is, after all, a game of opinions and in the humble opinion of this shite blogger, the approach of the last few year has been ill executed and led to regression instead of progress. We therefore, need a major rethink about how we go about what we do and who we charge with doing it, for all the reasons outlined within.
Onward
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The above graph is intended to visually illustrate how much instability there has been outside of Neil Critchley. The average tenure of someone who isn't Neil Critchley is only 257 days (at the time of writing) which isn't a recipe for stability. As we've seen above, changes in manager and changes in style impacts on the chances of recruitment working out and the graph above also starkly illustrates the frequent shift in footballing direction.
Whilst it's hard to imagine (and obviously, impossible to prove) what might have happened if each successive manager had more in common with the next, continuity is a factor in the ongoing success of clubs like Brighton, Bournemouth and Brentford (albeit at a higher level and with a significantly higher budget) - it's an obvious element of their managerial recruitment that each appointment is evolutionary as opposed to revolutionary.
We don't seem to share that ethos - why?
It's an interesting question to ponder - why do we lurch from one thing to another in terms of footballing style? I have no obvious answer and no special insight into the decision making processes - but when we take (as examples) the decision to replace Critchley with Bruce or Appleton with McCarthy it leads you to wonder how much faith we had in the original decisions we'd made.
In both cases, you couldn't really get more opposite in terms of character, approach and footballing philosophy. This would suggest that either, we don't have a particular ethos governing decisions (i.e. the initial decisions weren't governed by a particular 'vision') or that if we do, it isn't a very strong one because if it fails for a period of time, it's jettisoned to be replaced by a total contrast. It's great to admit we got it wrong, but ultimately, if we keep admitting we've got it wrong, it suggests we don't have a clear idea of what 'right' looks like.
When we initially appointed Neil Critchley, he was described in glowing terms by our then CEO as 'a modern manager' - yet he'd replaced the distinctly traditional Simon Grayson. Whilst arguably (and regardless of other qualities) Michael Appleton was also 'modern' in approach, it wasn't long after Critchley's departure before Mick McCarthy (definitely not modern) was in the house. From Mick, we swung back to the 'modern' Critchley but then replaced him with another traditional manager in Bruce before reverting to another 'technical' coach in Ian Evatt.
I could draw a loose line between Grayson, McCarthy and Bruce (broadly speaking, predominantly direct/physical with a sprinkling of skill in the right places) or between Appleton, Critchley and Evatt (essentially, technical players, possession and processes) - it's the mish-mash that makes it so hard to really understand what the overall picture is and that must surely have an impact on how we we recruit and the pathways available to the first team for players within the development system.
Part 2.3 Joined up recruitment? - Building a team, not a collection of individuals.
This is perhaps the hardest area to analyse in terms of raw data. In this section, we're going to think about the impact teammates have on individual players and this is really difficult to define. There's certain facts we can find within the data about how a particular relationship works - but that tends to apply more obviously to attacking players (for example, the impact of Liam Feeney crossing the ball to Armand Gnanduillet manifests in multiple assists and goals for the respective players.) Other relationships are harder to discern in the data, but never the less evident in what we see on the pitch - Richard Keogh clearly brought calm to Marvin Ekpiteta and in return offered the pace and movement that Keogh lacked.
It's, therefore, perhaps interesting to look at Jerry Yates and Josh Bowler's return to the club. Neither have yet hit the heights of their previous spells despite still being very much in their prime as footballers. It's tempting to say 'well, they're burned out, finished, they lack the desire, they've lost a yard of pace' - but this is a simplistic view of football - one that suggests players are isolated on the pitch, reliant purely on their own abilities. This is evidently not the case - and therefore, I'd suggest it's important to understand that neither of them are playing in the same teams that they were and therefore not really doing the same things or having the same kind of thing happening around them.
Lets take Yates first - in his first period at the club he played with 3 different strikers who were all bigger than him and would be, if partnered with him, the natural focal point for a direct ball - obviously, there was Madine (winning aerial duels at a rate of well above 5 per game), but also Simms (2.7 per game in his Blackpool career) and Beesley (a rate of around 4 headers won per game in the limited time he was fit whilst Yates was at the club) - Yates in the current set up has no one of this ilk and is himself charged with trying to win the long ball as opposed to picking up the pieces. It's perhaps not surprising that he's not really thriving in a role more suited to one of his strike partners than himself.
Lets look at Bowler - he is played in a different role with more defensive responsibility than he had in his initial spell where he was all but released from such duties by the fact the other 9 outfield players were some of the hardest working footballers you could imagine on a football pitch. Our running stats for this season (below) would suggest Bowler no longer has such a luxury and unsurprisingly, we don't see Bowler playing the same way. Players are part of a unit, their identity as individuals is linked to the role they play within the whole.
Whilst it's hard to imagine (and obviously, impossible to prove) what might have happened if each successive manager had more in common with the next, continuity is a factor in the ongoing success of clubs like Brighton, Bournemouth and Brentford (albeit at a higher level and with a significantly higher budget) - it's an obvious element of their managerial recruitment that each appointment is evolutionary as opposed to revolutionary.
We don't seem to share that ethos - why?
It's an interesting question to ponder - why do we lurch from one thing to another in terms of footballing style? I have no obvious answer and no special insight into the decision making processes - but when we take (as examples) the decision to replace Critchley with Bruce or Appleton with McCarthy it leads you to wonder how much faith we had in the original decisions we'd made.
In both cases, you couldn't really get more opposite in terms of character, approach and footballing philosophy. This would suggest that either, we don't have a particular ethos governing decisions (i.e. the initial decisions weren't governed by a particular 'vision') or that if we do, it isn't a very strong one because if it fails for a period of time, it's jettisoned to be replaced by a total contrast. It's great to admit we got it wrong, but ultimately, if we keep admitting we've got it wrong, it suggests we don't have a clear idea of what 'right' looks like.
When we initially appointed Neil Critchley, he was described in glowing terms by our then CEO as 'a modern manager' - yet he'd replaced the distinctly traditional Simon Grayson. Whilst arguably (and regardless of other qualities) Michael Appleton was also 'modern' in approach, it wasn't long after Critchley's departure before Mick McCarthy (definitely not modern) was in the house. From Mick, we swung back to the 'modern' Critchley but then replaced him with another traditional manager in Bruce before reverting to another 'technical' coach in Ian Evatt.
I could draw a loose line between Grayson, McCarthy and Bruce (broadly speaking, predominantly direct/physical with a sprinkling of skill in the right places) or between Appleton, Critchley and Evatt (essentially, technical players, possession and processes) - it's the mish-mash that makes it so hard to really understand what the overall picture is and that must surely have an impact on how we we recruit and the pathways available to the first team for players within the development system.
Part 2.3 Joined up recruitment? - Building a team, not a collection of individuals.
This is perhaps the hardest area to analyse in terms of raw data. In this section, we're going to think about the impact teammates have on individual players and this is really difficult to define. There's certain facts we can find within the data about how a particular relationship works - but that tends to apply more obviously to attacking players (for example, the impact of Liam Feeney crossing the ball to Armand Gnanduillet manifests in multiple assists and goals for the respective players.) Other relationships are harder to discern in the data, but never the less evident in what we see on the pitch - Richard Keogh clearly brought calm to Marvin Ekpiteta and in return offered the pace and movement that Keogh lacked.
It's, therefore, perhaps interesting to look at Jerry Yates and Josh Bowler's return to the club. Neither have yet hit the heights of their previous spells despite still being very much in their prime as footballers. It's tempting to say 'well, they're burned out, finished, they lack the desire, they've lost a yard of pace' - but this is a simplistic view of football - one that suggests players are isolated on the pitch, reliant purely on their own abilities. This is evidently not the case - and therefore, I'd suggest it's important to understand that neither of them are playing in the same teams that they were and therefore not really doing the same things or having the same kind of thing happening around them.
Lets take Yates first - in his first period at the club he played with 3 different strikers who were all bigger than him and would be, if partnered with him, the natural focal point for a direct ball - obviously, there was Madine (winning aerial duels at a rate of well above 5 per game), but also Simms (2.7 per game in his Blackpool career) and Beesley (a rate of around 4 headers won per game in the limited time he was fit whilst Yates was at the club) - Yates in the current set up has no one of this ilk and is himself charged with trying to win the long ball as opposed to picking up the pieces. It's perhaps not surprising that he's not really thriving in a role more suited to one of his strike partners than himself.
Lets look at Bowler - he is played in a different role with more defensive responsibility than he had in his initial spell where he was all but released from such duties by the fact the other 9 outfield players were some of the hardest working footballers you could imagine on a football pitch. Our running stats for this season (below) would suggest Bowler no longer has such a luxury and unsurprisingly, we don't see Bowler playing the same way. Players are part of a unit, their identity as individuals is linked to the role they play within the whole.
 |
| Source: allfootball.com |
Now lets apply this to other signings. Lets consider, (for the sake of argument), Jordan Brown, George Honeyman and Leighton Clarkson - they've played enough games for us to get a proper look at them but none of them have nailed themselves down as 'defined successes' - yet, they've been popular players at their previous clubs and played their part in successful teams.
It's a challenge to work out exactly why these signing haven't worked as we'd like. Yes, we can see what they lack - but we know that despite those deficits, they've done more than enough previously - We don't know exactly what the blend of the Leyton Orient, Millwall or Aberdeen teams was. What precisely was their role in relation to others? Who, for example, might have allowed Clarkson to play in the physical Scottish league? Who, hypothetically might have picked up the ball from Brown for Leyton Orient? What was Honeyman's role at Millwall? Without going to the lengths of watching multiple games of our signings former teams to work out the difference in what surrounded them then and now it's difficult to be sure - but it's clear that few signings of recent times have come to us and looked better than they did before they signed for us.
It seems unlikely that every footballer loses skill, desire and ability simply by setting foot on the Fylde Coast. What seems more likely is that some of them don't really fit into the team because the team they're walking into has different qualities than the one they've left.
That would suggest a lack of deeper thinking about how the various signings are intended to fit into a whole.
That conclusion is speculative - but the alternatives (they're receiving worse technical coaching, are part of an inferior tactical set up, are demotivated in comparison to their previous clubs or are indeed 'washed up, finished, inferior versions of their previous selves') are also quite damning and, to be honest, seem more unlikely.
To return to an earlier point, Terry McPhillips had a smaller budget, worse facilities, significantly less experience himself and within his coaching staff - but yet broadly speaking, achieved similar results - I find it less likely that all of our recent managers have actively 'damaged' players by their methods - I find it more likely that we're simply not getting the blend of recruitment right and that the ever changing parameters we've explored above don't help.
Part 3: What does this all mean for us now?
Lets look at how we're doing on the pitch over recent seasons - because ultimately, that's the acid test of any recruitment strategy. Football clubs sign players to improve their squads and win games
We'll start by looking at our data for this season. (I'm making the assumption that most readers will be more than aware of our results, but that looking at the underlying data might give some insight into the quality of performances)
The graphs that follow indicate how we're performing in comparison to the rest of the division (accurate as of 30/10/2026)
The attacking data shows a fairly mediocre (mostly midtable) set of numbers and tells a story of imbalance - in fact, a story of the most imbalanced team in the division and one that seriously struggles to put in crosses or play through balls. It's a team that plays a lot of direct balls and yet, lacks any real physical presence up front. Goals have been scored, but equally, it's evident that compared to the rest of the division, the attacking threat isn't anything particularly special.
The defensive data is frightening. We've conceded lots - but we should, in fact, have conceded more. The one undeniable fact is, Bailey Peacock Farrell (the leading save maker in the division, who has faced the most shots) can't be held to account for our shocking stats. We don't stop crosses, we rarely intercept the ball, we concede a lot on the counter attack, we can't defend a set piece and we spend the most time in the division in our own third and not a great deal of time (compared to others) in the opposition third.
When we combine this with the running stats cited earlier (19th in distance covered and 23rd in sprints) then there's a worrying picture of a team which has some fundamental weaknesses.
It's surprising to see how many tackles we've put in and perhaps this to some degree challenges the assumption that the midfield is the crux of the problem - or perhaps it just illustrates we spend more time on the back foot than other teams.
It's perhaps worth looking at the bigger picture. Are we getting better or worse?
The following data compares the same values against last season (i.e. where we stand against the rest of the division currently, vs where we stood against the rest of League 1 in 2025)
It's a challenge to work out exactly why these signing haven't worked as we'd like. Yes, we can see what they lack - but we know that despite those deficits, they've done more than enough previously - We don't know exactly what the blend of the Leyton Orient, Millwall or Aberdeen teams was. What precisely was their role in relation to others? Who, for example, might have allowed Clarkson to play in the physical Scottish league? Who, hypothetically might have picked up the ball from Brown for Leyton Orient? What was Honeyman's role at Millwall? Without going to the lengths of watching multiple games of our signings former teams to work out the difference in what surrounded them then and now it's difficult to be sure - but it's clear that few signings of recent times have come to us and looked better than they did before they signed for us.
It seems unlikely that every footballer loses skill, desire and ability simply by setting foot on the Fylde Coast. What seems more likely is that some of them don't really fit into the team because the team they're walking into has different qualities than the one they've left.
That would suggest a lack of deeper thinking about how the various signings are intended to fit into a whole.
That conclusion is speculative - but the alternatives (they're receiving worse technical coaching, are part of an inferior tactical set up, are demotivated in comparison to their previous clubs or are indeed 'washed up, finished, inferior versions of their previous selves') are also quite damning and, to be honest, seem more unlikely.
To return to an earlier point, Terry McPhillips had a smaller budget, worse facilities, significantly less experience himself and within his coaching staff - but yet broadly speaking, achieved similar results - I find it less likely that all of our recent managers have actively 'damaged' players by their methods - I find it more likely that we're simply not getting the blend of recruitment right and that the ever changing parameters we've explored above don't help.
Part 3: What does this all mean for us now?
Lets look at how we're doing on the pitch over recent seasons - because ultimately, that's the acid test of any recruitment strategy. Football clubs sign players to improve their squads and win games
We'll start by looking at our data for this season. (I'm making the assumption that most readers will be more than aware of our results, but that looking at the underlying data might give some insight into the quality of performances)
The graphs that follow indicate how we're performing in comparison to the rest of the division (accurate as of 30/10/2026)
The attacking data shows a fairly mediocre (mostly midtable) set of numbers and tells a story of imbalance - in fact, a story of the most imbalanced team in the division and one that seriously struggles to put in crosses or play through balls. It's a team that plays a lot of direct balls and yet, lacks any real physical presence up front. Goals have been scored, but equally, it's evident that compared to the rest of the division, the attacking threat isn't anything particularly special.
The defensive data is frightening. We've conceded lots - but we should, in fact, have conceded more. The one undeniable fact is, Bailey Peacock Farrell (the leading save maker in the division, who has faced the most shots) can't be held to account for our shocking stats. We don't stop crosses, we rarely intercept the ball, we concede a lot on the counter attack, we can't defend a set piece and we spend the most time in the division in our own third and not a great deal of time (compared to others) in the opposition third.
When we combine this with the running stats cited earlier (19th in distance covered and 23rd in sprints) then there's a worrying picture of a team which has some fundamental weaknesses.
It's surprising to see how many tackles we've put in and perhaps this to some degree challenges the assumption that the midfield is the crux of the problem - or perhaps it just illustrates we spend more time on the back foot than other teams.
It's perhaps worth looking at the bigger picture. Are we getting better or worse?
The following data compares the same values against last season (i.e. where we stand against the rest of the division currently, vs where we stood against the rest of League 1 in 2025)
Defensively, it's possible to make an argument that we are worse (or at best, no better) - we're conceding more shots and a higher quality of chance more frequently, we're significantly more likely to be countered upon, even though we're not spending a huge amount more time in the opposition third, we're making a lot less interceptions. The only metric that seems to have changed significantly for the better is tackling.
In attacking terms we can see some improvement, even if the number of goals hasn't proportionally improved that much. We are shooting more, the XG suggests we're having 'better' shots when we shoot and we're dribbling more successfully. The imbalance though has been present for some time and we're still struggling to get crosses into the box. Through ball stats are slightly deceptive as for some reason the data source rounds up through balls per game to a whole number (therefore grouping a lot of teams together) so a drop from 2 to 24th isn't quite as dramatic as it seems but nonetheless we've failed this season to play as many. It's also notable that we've become weaker in the air against the previous season.
What we can see from the above is that it's possible to discern a little bit of progress in some areas against the previous season. It's not an overwhelming amount and we could equally point to areas where our performance has declined.
This is a superficial analysis as I've already acknowledged - but the data above does point to a struggling team and the results within the period don't really contradict that. If there's other metrics available somewhere which create a different narrative, then great - but ultimately, results and performance and the data available here would suggest that we don't have significant grounds for optimism right now.
The story told above is one of a team that, despite two different managers and three transfer windows isn't showing any huge signs of improvement or any obvious evidence of being outstanding at anything in particular. There are glaring weaknesses that are present over a long period and whilst all teams have weaknesses, good recruitment addresses weaknesses and creates strengths that counter balance the issues.
If we briefly analyse our last promotion side, it's not immediate obvious that we were a very good team (data like passing accuracy, tackles, interceptions is all quite 'mid table') - as we dig deeper though, we see a superb ability to restrict the opponents shots (4/24). That season we conceded 0 goals from counter attacks, were 2/24 in terms of goals from open play and 2/24 from goals at set pieces, were 3/24 in terms of restricting crosses into our box and despite Neil Critchley's reputation for 'fannying about at the back' spent the least time of any team in our own third of the pitch and are high up (7/24) for shots per game. In other words, whilst the team isn't good at everything, it's really good at some things, particular individuals (Ballard and Madine at the front and the back) are statistically dominant in the air and Kenny Dougall in the centre of midfield wins the most tackles of any player in the league.
The point here, is that not every player needs to be good in the air or great at winning tackles. The side of 20/21 was only 'average' at that as a whole - but it had the right blend of players in the right place and some significant overall aptitudes and that isn't something that is apparent when we look at this current squad or the previous one.
For what it's worth, whilst we're in the mood for comparing and contrasting, Critchley's 2nd go at things was also palpably significantly better than where we are now (5/24 for XGa 7/24 for XG, 8/24 shots per game, 2/24 shots against per game, 4/24 aerial duels won 8/24 passing accuracy, 8/24 interceptions per game, 5/24 set pieces conceded, 3/24 time spent in own third.) I cite that data to illustrate that when we returned to the division we're still in, whilst we might have lacked a pleasing style of play and had a nasty habit of losing away from home, we certainly were 'competitive' and possessed of significant relative strengths. In other words, the decline to where we are now wasn't inevitable and the relegation and chaos of the McCarthy/Appleton season hadn't damaged us fatally. The real decline has happened since.
I'd love to analyse the difference between the immediate pre-Sadler era squad and this one in order to fully ram home the point about costs and performance, but unfortunately there is no detailed data available for 2018/19 - so, we'll just have to remember once more that we finished 10th under Terry McPhillips. I don't remember all that much about that squad, but I do remember we had height at the back in Ben Hennigan, we had height up front in Armand Gnanduillet, we had Liam Feeney to deliver a cross to him, Jay Spearing to rat about, some young quality in Jordan Thompson and Marc Bola and whilst the football was rugged, it basically made sense even if it wasn't much fun to watch.
Part 4: What do we learn from all this?
My feeling over the last few years is that what we're doing doesn't make sense. We're spending more money to get less and making decisions I don't understand when I step back and look at things objectively.
Lets be clear, I'm a hypocrite - I'm writing this as if I'm a clinical observer and with the benefit of hindsight. I'm a) a fan and b) I make lots of wrong calls. Nonetheless, I shall continue!
4.1: Decision making is reactive and that creates problems if trying to execute 'a plan'
If we take, say, the decision to dismiss Neil Critchley as a case study - I was as fed up as the next man at his cautious football and as jilted as the next lover by his flit to Aston Villa. I shed no tears when Critchley left - but it's clear as night follows day in the data that Critchley produced the two best teams we've had in League One since Simon Grayson's promotion side. What I don't understand is why this wasn't more evident to the objective decision makers and why switching to Steve Bruce football was the obvious solution to a poor home defeat against Stockport, when really, the obvious thing lacking in the previous season was essentially, decent quality wing backs or a little bit more freedom/flexibility. Instead of an evolution, we got a wholesale change in approach.
4.2: Changing styles frequently leaves holes in the make up of squads
If a lack of wing backs was a glaring hole in the Critchley blueprint, I've never understood how it was that Steve Bruce's Blackpool (long balls per game rank within division 1/24) was never furnished with a genuine physical centre forward - particularly as unlike Critchley, Bruce liked to play much deeper, spending a lot more time in our own third making that out ball really important. Similarly, Bruce favoured a midfield two which begged for a dominant all action midfielder - Neil Critchley preferred a 3 and had a much more technical style so Bruce's midfield never really looked quite 'right' even in his generally quite enjoyable first season.
Now we have Ian Evatt, who talks of total football and fluidity but has literally zero pace available in defence, even with everyone fit and has inherited the total absence of dominant physicality in the forward line and a load of aging players on long contracts because for reasons that aren't wholly clear, we've stopped making any real effort to bring in younger players despite the sums raised over time by their sales.
4.3: The club doesn't seem to have a plan and if it does, lacks the confidence to stick to that plan:
The decision making by the club has, at times, seemed almost like that of a supporter. Perhaps that makes sense to some degree because the owner is a supporter (and let me be clear, I'd every day of the week, rather that than a faceless body or someone with zero connection with the club.) We do however, spend quite a lot of money on various staff at executive level and below, to ensure that we make professional decisions - and yet, sometimes, it feels like we act 'on a whim', on an opportunity or according to sentiment as opposed to the kind of cold logic that drives the best footballing decisions.
Fans will always say 'the club should listen to us' and to some extent, yes, it should, when things like ticketing and other 'matchday experience and supporter culture' elements are concerned.
What it shouldn't do is operate on the basis of fan sentiment, firing managers because the fans dislike them or buying players because the fans like them and so on and so forth. Fans are idiots, me included. I wrote plenty of complaint about Neil Critchley and I wrote at length about how we needed to spend all the money on Steve Bruce's new team because nothing could possibly go wrong. Neither proved to be the right 'take' - but then, we are just fans, we are just idiots chatting shit about football in our spare time. It's not what we're being paid to do. We bring the emotion to the game, we bring the desperation, the romanticism, the superstition and all the rest - the professionals should bring the knowledge and the clinical decision making.
We could equally see the signing of Jerry Yates in a similar way. We already possess Dion Charles and Dale Taylor who are similar players to Yates - what we needed was probably something a bit different. Again, don't get me wrong, I was absolutely thrilled to see Jerry back in tangerine - but when that signing probably means we're unlikely to possess anyone who effectively contrasts Charles or Taylor, then I'd wonder if, in the cold light of day, it was quite the right choice to make. Let me be really clear, I'd not rule out Jerry being a success for a moment and I'd be thrilled if he proves so - but the fact is, to end up with three strikers who are all essentially the same player and the only alternative being a fitful semi-converted winger doesn't look like long term planning for all outcomes and situations.
4.4 Change is desperately needed
If we go back to the opening analysis we can see that we've got a real need to improve the outcomes from our recruitment - remember, we're not simply performing worse season on season, but we're also spending more money, year on year with dwindling turnover. Put very simply, with financial rules as they are (where permitted wages and turnover are related and owner input into playing squad purchases subject to more limitiations) we have no choice but to make our money work harder than it does now.
Our recruitment has, over a period of time, failed to generate success on the pitch or the prospect of increasing our income through player sales. If that trend continues, turnover/income will decline and we'll be even further limited in terms of the quality of player we can bring in to the club - that's an obvious cycle of decline in waiting as if we can't turn £10 million into success, why would the same staff be able to turn a smaller figure into a coherent football team?
The change that is needed includes is a clear direction or purpose. A renewed sense of what the club is doing, what its basic footballing values are which would in turn, provide a clear process for decisions across the staff body.
In order to achieve that, it needs an objective individual with strong knowledge of what it takes to put together a successful football structure. That person needs to the conviction to stick to a plan, because a plan over time is how to get genuine value for money - through well targeted, shrewd and logical signings, based around defined need, built upon year on year. That person also needs to ensure the club then has the right culture to make the absolute most out of those signings.
Whilst yes, there's a part of every football supporter that wants to win every week, most fans would get behind such an approach and would recognise that whilst it's highly unlikely (and indeed, under financial rules, nigh upon impossible) we'll outspend everyone in the division, the idea of trying to be more canny in what we do is necessary.
There should be no doom about this. We've done this before in recent memory and we can do it again. There's no financial reason why we can't - all that is stopping us is footballing decisions. Not every club in League 1 submits full accounts, so it's not possible to discern exactly how much everyone spends on wages. What we can say for certain is that Cambridge's most recent accounts suggest a total spend of 6.5 (about 2/3rd of our most recent spend) million - they currently sit 7th in the league having lost 2 in 13. Lincoln City's most recent set of accounts suggest a total wage spend of 7.5 million (about 76% of our figure for the same season) - and yet, they sit well above us in the pyramid.
We don't have the *most* money in this division - but competing in League 1 is clearly well within our means. It's understandable that we couldn't keep up with Birmingham or Wrexham, but the approach we've taken since we've dropped out of the division above (and whether coincidentally or otherwise) hasn't allowed us to compete with clubs who have less than us. Clubs such as those mentioned above as well as Stevenage, Mansfield and others would cut their hands off to have our resources and evidence suggests, would use them better.
It's time for a clean slate and a new approach. We can all be extremely grateful for Simon Sadler's ownership and his ongoing investment is beyond doubt, we can and most of us do, accept him as one of our own - but in doing so, we also reserve the right to do what we'd do to anyone else in the fan base - which is point out differences of opinion. Football is, after all, a game of opinions and in the humble opinion of this shite blogger, the approach of the last few year has been ill executed and led to regression instead of progress. We therefore, need a major rethink about how we go about what we do and who we charge with doing it, for all the reasons outlined within.
Onward
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